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DEFERENCE WITH A DIFFERENCE:
OF RIGHTS, REGULATION AND
THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
JOHN M EVANS*
Judge of the Federal Court of Canada, Appeal Division
Emeritus Professor,Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto

A PLEA FOR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN THE NEW SOUTH
AFRICA
In preparing to participate in a conference on South Africa's new
administrative law, I read Realising Administrative Justice,' a book of essays

edited by Professor Hugh Corder and Ms Linda van der Vijver, and published
on the coming into force of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.2 A
theme running through several of the essays of this book is the critical
importance of achieving a proper balance in administrative law between
enabling administrators to get on with their job of delivering the public
programmes that are of paramount importance to the development of South
Africa and its people, and the need to protect individuals against the abuse of
power by government, including by inaction.
This is, of course, the same tension that is found in any constitutional
democracy, but it may have an especial urgency in the new South Africa, given
the bleakness of its recent past and the daunting nature of the challenges now
facing it. Rethinking the role of the judiciary in the governance of a newly
democratic country committed to fundamental social and economic
transformations is no easy task.
I noted, particularly, the essay by Professor Hoexter, 'The current state of
South African administrative law', 3 in which the author's solution for striking
the appropriate balance lay in the development of a theory of deference to
guide the judiciary in the exercise of their judicial review jurisdiction
* BA BCL (Oxon). This paper is based on a presentation that I gave to an LLM class at the University of
Cape Town on August 1,2002. 1 am very grateful to Professor Hugh Corder for inviting me to revisit Cape
Town and for providing an opportunity for me to speak with students and faculty members in the Faculty of
Law.
, (2002).
2 Act 3 of 2000. Hereafter referred to as PAJA.
3Op cit note I at 20-37.
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conferred by the broad grounds of review in s 6 of the PAJA, the prohibition
of ouster clauses by s 34 of the Constitution, 4 and the generous requirements
for standing in s 38 of the Constitution. Moreover, the paucity of merits
review by appeal tribunals is liable to give judicial review an undue
prominence in the supervision of the administration.
Professor Hoexter has spelled out her theory of deference in a fine article,
'The future of judicial review in South African administrative law'. 5 After
distancing her theory from the kind of submissiveness to the Executive that
had characterized the worst of thejudiciary under the ancien r6gime, she says:
'Rather, the sort of deference we should be aspiring to consists of a judicial willingness to
appreciate the legitimate and constitutionally-ordained province of administrative agencies;
to admit the expertise of those agencies in policy-laden or polycentric issues; to accord their
interpretations of fact and law due respect; and to be sensitive in general to the interests
legitimately pursued by administrative bodies and the practical and financial constraints
under which they operate. This type of deference isperfectly consistent with a concern for
individual rights and a refusal to tolerate corruption and maladministration. It ought to be
shaped not by an unwillingness to scrutinize administrative action, but by a careful weighing
up of the need for - and the consequences of-judicial intervention. Above all, it ought
be shaped by a conscious determination not to6 usurp the functions of administrative
agencies; not to cross over from review to appeal.'

Professor Hoexter then identifies what she calls the principle of
'variability' 7 as one mechanism for avoiding the excessive judicial interventionism that she fears may result from the broad constitutional right to
'lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair' administrative action conferred on
everyone by s 33(1) of the Constitution, and the broad grounds ofreview in s 6
of the PAJA, including the basket provision in s 6(2)(i) (action that is
'otherwise unlawful'). By 'variability', Professor Hoexter seems to mean,
among other things, that the content of the grounds of review cannot be
assumed to be self-evident or monolithic. Rather, specific content must
be supplied in light of the particular legal and administrative contexts of the
impugned action, or inaction.
This, in my opinion, must be the way forward forjudicial review in South
Africa: the way to ensure both that administrators have the legal and administrative tools necessary to deliver the programmes of regulation and
redistribution within their mandates, and that administrators observe the
constitutional principles of legality, rationality, participatory decision-making
and accountability. These competing considerations are more likely to be
accommodated well in the long run by the development of a legal culture in
which judges approach issues of judicial review by thinking in a pragmatic
way about the appropriate allocation of responsibilities between courts and

4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. Hereafter referred to as 'the
Constitution'.
5 (2000) 117 SALJ484.

6 Op cit note 5 at 501-2. By 'appeal', I understand the author to mean a review of the merits of the
decision, including the correctness of findings of fact, and the wisdom of the exercise of any discretion, on

which the decision was based.
Op cit note 5 at 502-5.
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the administration, than by attempts by Parliament to impose formalistic
8
limitations on the scope ofjudicial review.
THE CANADIAN WAY
The pragmatic orfunctional approach
Over the last twenty years the Canadian judiciary, led by the Supreme
Court of Canada, has developed a sophisticated analytical framework within
which to determine the proper roles of the generalist courts and specialist
administrative agencies in the decision-making process. Despite the vast
differences between the challenges facing Canada and South Africa, their
administrative structures9 and available resources, Canada's distinctive
approach to public law provides a source of ideas and experience that might
be useful to South African lawyers when responding to Professor Hoexter's
challenge to develop and operationalize a theory of deference.
The term 'a pragmatic or functional analysis' is now used by the Supreme
Court of Canada to connote its approach to most of the administrative law
problems that come before it. It was originally coined in the late 1980s to
determine the standard of review applicable to administrative agencies'
decisions interpreting and applying their enabling legislation, especially
labour tribunals whose decisions are often protected by a preclusive clause. 10
Since then, however, the same underlying methodology is apparent in the way
that courts have examined the context of administrative action in order to
determine the content of the duty of fairness," approached the review of the
exercise of discretion by officials of main-line government departments,12
defined the circumstances in which administrative action may be impeached
collaterally (as a defence to criminal proceedings, for example) rather than
through the statutory avenues of redress created for this purpose, 13 and, more
generally and importantly, tackled the interpretation of legislation.
8 See, for example, the narrow definition of'administrative action'in s 1 ofPAJA, which limits the scope
ofthe act to the review ofa decision which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct external
legal effect. The apparent intent of such provisions may be thwarted by a broad judicial interpretation or a
determination that, in so far as they unduly limit the scope ofthe right created by s 33(1) of the Constitution,
they do not 'give effect' to it within the meaning of s 33(3). Contrast the more flexible definition of
reviewable administrative action contained in the Federal Court Act RSC 1985 c F-7, s 18.1, as exemplified
by Larny Holdings Lid (c o b Quickie Convenience Stores) 2002 FCT 750 (legality of letter written by Minister
warning retailers that it is illegal to sell multiple packages of cigarettes at a discount reviewable). Compare
Gillick v Wisbech Health Authority [1986] AC 112 (declaration of invalidity available in appropriate cases with
respect to non-statutory circulars).
9 I have in mind, particularly, the prevalence in Canada of rights of appeal to independent specialist
administrative tribunals from decisions determining individual rights made by line officials in government
departments or by municipalities, and of independent tribunals that perform regulatory functions that in
other jurisdictions might be the responsibility of a minister.
10 See UES, Local 298v Bibeault [198812 SCP 1048 at 1088. BeetzJ contrasted this method of analysis
with the formalism of the 'preliminary or collateral question' theory as a method for identifying which
statutory provisions that agency had to interpret correctly in order to remain within its jurisdiction.
11 See, for example, Knight v Indian Head School Division No 19 [1990] 1 SCR 653. One is tempted to
suggest that the effect of the pragnmatic or functional approach in this context is to shape the content of
the duty of fairness on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis: is the harm likely to be avoided by affording the
particular procedural right claimed greater than the likely costs of requiring it?
12 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817.
13 See, for example, R v Consolidated Maybrun Mines Ltd [1998] 1 SCR 706; R v Al Klippert Ltd [1998] 1
SCR 737.
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Indeed, many of the intellectual assumptions that underlie 'a pragmatic or
functional analysis' are evident in the way that courts nowadays tackle issues in
all areas of the law. It represents a retreat from the abstract and general concepts
of legal positivism or formalism, and a recognition that, in law as in life itself,
the barrier between 'is' and 'ought' is quite permeable. Through the pragmatic
or functional approach, courts attempt to ensure that solutions are found to

legal problems that are derived from the rationales or values underlying
the relevant legal rules (deciding cases from first principles). It recognises the
inherently open-ended nature of legal rules and the indeterminate nature of
language and the limited utility in trying to craft precise rules and exceptions.
The pragmatic or functional approach to legal issues tends to be more
willing to leave judges with the task of weighing the relevant factors and
exercising discretion in light of the circumstances of a case (as for example, by
creating the reliability and necessity of evidence as a residual exception to the
rule against the admission of hearsay14), and taking into account social
context 15 and the likely consequences of decisions.
This may also be called a contextual approach to law, and is similar to what I
understand Professor Hoexter to mean when she refers to 'variability' as an
essential element in fashioning an appropriate legal framework within which
the courts review administrative action.
Rather than tracing in tiresome detail the case law elaborating the elements
of the pragmatic or functional approach to judicial review in Canada, 16 1 shall
attempt to trace some of the assumptions on which it rests, and some of the
implications for the way that we have traditionally thought about the law and
the roles of the courts.
Statutory interpretation
The key to the new administrative law in Canada lies in the courts'
approach to the interpretation of legislation. Indeed, the doctrine ofjudicial
restraint or deference is said to rest ultimately on legislative choice, as
indicated by, among other things, the text and purpose of the enabling
legislation under which the relevant public programme is delivered and the
characteristics of the institutions created to administer it.
The fundamental shift in the way that courts interpret legislation is not,
of course, a phenomenon that is confined to Canada, nor to the interpretation
See Rv Kan [1990] 2 SCR 531; Rv Smith [1992] 2 SCR 915.
15 See, for example, R v S (RD)[1997] 3 SCR 484.
16 Useful judicial overviews of the emergence of the current law can be found in National Corn Growers
Assn v Canada(Import Tribunal) [1990] 2 SCR 1324 at 1331-46 (per WilsonJ),and Canada(Attorney General)v
Public Service Alliance of Canada[1991] 1 SCR 614 at 649-57 (per CoryJ). Pushpanathanv Canada (Ministerof
Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 SCR 982, is perhaps the case now most frequently cited for its
restatement ofthe elements of the pragmatic or functional analysis used to identify the standard of review to
be applied to an administrative agency's determination of a question of law. In one of its most significant
administrative law decisions since 1979, Baker v Canada(Ministerof Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR
817, the Supreme Court of Canada, among other things, applied the pragmatic or functional analysis to
determine the standard of review applicable to the exercise of discretion by an immigration officer, noting
(para 54) that 'there is no easy distinction to be made between interpretation and the exercise of discretion'.
14
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of statutes creating public programs and empowering the agencies that
administer them. Nonetheless, the interpretation of the legislation under
which public programmes are delivered can rightly claim the status of an
important sub-specialty, in part because, when a statutory scheme entrusts
first level decision-making to a public authority other than a court, a
reviewing court must ask whether the view of the court or of the
administrative decision-maker on the interpretation of the enabling
legislation, or on its application to the facts, carries the day.
I set out below some elements of our courts' current understandings of the
interpretative process that have been of particular importance in shaping
the pragmatic or functional approach to administrative law in general and to
determining the standard of review in particular. If regularity of citation is any
guide, the Supreme Court of Canada seems to have pinned its interpretative
colours to the following passage:
'Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in
their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the
17
scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.'

However, more specific guidance on the Court's current practices is also
available:
(a)

(b)

While dictionaries provide the range of meanings that words can bear in
'ordinary speech', the particular shade of meaning to be attributed to
a
given word or phrase is derived from the context in which it is used. In
the case of statutory language, the interpretative context includes: the
overall purposes of the statute; the legislative history of the scheme and
the Act; the function in the statutory scheme of the particular provision
in dispute; and the impact of the legislation on fundamental individual
rights and constitutional values, including, in particular, those protected
by constitutional1 8 and quasi-constitutionali 9 instruments, and by
20
international legal norms.
Statutory texts are often incomplete and ambiguous: legislators cannot
foresee and deal with all the problems likely to be encountered in
the administration of any regulatory scheme, all the facts to which it will
be argued that the statute applies, and changes in societal values.
Regulatory legislation is often more realistically conceived as a set of
directional pointers rather than a comprehensive blueprint containing

17 E A Driedger Construction of Statutes 2 ed (1983).
i
The Constitution Acts 1867-1982, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
introduced as part of the package that patriated the Constitution.
19 These include: the Canadian Bill of Rights, a statutory precursor ofthe Charter enacted in 1960 and
applicable only to the federal Parliament and government; anti-discrinination legislation; and access to
information statutes.
20 See, for example, Rahaman v Canada(Ministerof Citizenshipand Immigration) 2002 FCA 89 paras 34-49.
The effect of international norms is not necessarily to reduce the scope of a public authority's statutory
power. For example, writing for the majority in 114957 CanadaLt& (Spraytech, Soditi d'Arrosage) v Hudson
(Towun) [2001] 2 SCR 241, L'Heureux-Dub6J found support in international law respecting the environment
for upholding a municipal by-law restricting the use of pesticides on private property.
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statute should be interpreted and applied.
When creating a statutory programme, Parliament can be presumed to
have intended that the enabling legislation be interpreted in a manner
best calculated to achieve its overall purposes. Hence, when filling gaps
and resolving ambiguities in the statutory text, the body charged with
its interpretation should consider the impact on the efficacy of the
programme, and the efficiency with which it is delivered, when
interpreting or applying the statute one way rather than another. In the
interpretation and application of legislation, the distinction between
law and policy is often blurred, at best.
The range of knowledge, experience and perspectives required for the
effective interpretation of legislation is not limited to those possessed by
judges. Indeed, it was partly in recognition of this fact that Parliament
created a specialist agency to administer the legislation, a task that
includes deciding how the legislation should be interpreted and applied
to particular facts, generally case-by-case at first, but later through the
promulgation of guidelines and other decisional criteria.
Hence, on an application for judicial review in which the applicant
alleges that the administrative decision-maker misinterpreted a
provision in the statute, or misapplied it to the facts, the reviewing court
should not assume that it is the function of the court to determine the
'correct' meaning or application of the statute. For, as Dickson J so
shrewdly noted with respect to the ambiguous statutory provision
examined in the leading case of Canadian Union of Public Employees,
Local 963 v New Brunswick Liquor Corp,21 'there is no one interpretation
which can be said to be "right"'. Or, at least, if there is a 'right' answer,
the skills and institutional characteristics of the judiciary may not be
well suited for determining it. An understanding of the subject matter
of the scheme (labour relations, land use, or telecommunications, for
example), including an appreciation of the likely consequences of
interpreting the statute one way rather than another, and the perspective
brought to the task by members of the specialist agency, may prove more
valuable to making an informed decision on the meaning to be
attributed to the statute so as best to advance its purposes.
Thus, if the question in dispute is one that the administrative
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(c)

(d)

(e)

(t)

decision-maker is better positioned than a court to answer, a reviewing

court should only conclude that the decision is erroneous in law if it is
unreasonable.22 I should note that our courts recognize a standard of

21 [1979] 2 SCR 227 at 237.
2- See Domtar Inc v Quebec(Commission d 'appel en mati&e de lisionsprofessionelles)[1993] 2 SCR 756 at 772,
where LHeureux-Dub6 J said that determining the standard of review is about deciding whether the
administrative tribunal or the reviewing court 'is in the best position to rule on the impugned decision'.

328

THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL
2 3
review scale that slides from unreasonable (or, clearly wrong) to
patently unreasonable, a very deferential standard reserved, in the main,
for Ministerial decisions with a high policy content and agency
2
decisions protected by a strong ouster clause. 4

(g)

On the other hand, courts interpret in a broad and purposive manner
the fundamental rights protected by anti-discrimination legislation and
the Charter. Since courts regard themselves as having a special
responsibility to protect fundamental rights and constitutional values
they do not defer to administrators' decisions on how to balance these
rights against competing considerations. Thus, when an administrative
decision impinges on a Charter-protected right, the reviewing court
will decide for itselfwhether the decision can be upheld under s 1 of the
Charter as a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.25 Similarly, the Supreme Court
of Canada has consistently reviewed human rights tribunals'
interpretation of anti-discrimination legislation on a standard of
correctness, 26 in large part because of the close connection between
the statutory right to be free from discrimination and the right under
s 15 of the Charter to equality before and under the law without
discrimination on the enumerated grounds and those analogous
thereto. One might say that courts in Canada have applied at the
administrative law level the direction to courts contained in United
States v Carolene Products Co27 with respect to the judicial review
of legislation: that is, defer to agency decisions made in the course of
administering programmes of economic regulation, but remain vigilant
when the constitutional rights of individuals are at stake. In my opinion,
the law and the courts that administer it have a special responsibility
towards those whose interests are not adequately served by either the
market or the political process.

DEFERENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW
It could be argued that for the South African courts to adopt a policy of
judicial restraint, or deference, towards administrative action that affects
individuals' rights would be an abdication of their responsibility to uphold the

23 This term was coined by lacobucciJ in Canada (Directorof Investigation and Research, Competition Act)
v Southam Inc [1997] 1 SCR 748 at 776 to connote an intermediate standard of review between patently
unreasonable and wrong. 'An unreasonable decision,' said lacobucci J, 'is one that, in the main, is not
supported by any reasons that can stand up to a somewhat probing examination.'
24 In Southam supra note 23 at 777 IacobucciJ said that a decision was patently unreasonable if the defect
is obvious or immediately apparent. An earlier formulation had spoken more clearly to the seriousnessof the
defect, rather than its obviousness. Thus, in Syndicat des employis de production du Quibec et de I'Acadiev Canada
(LabourRelations Board) [1984] 2 SCR 412 at 420, BeetzJ said that a patently unreasonable interpretation of
legislation 'amounts to a fraud on the law',and is treated as 'an act which is done arbitrarily or in bad faith and
is contrary to the principles of natural justice'. In my opinion, given the complexity and non-obviousness of
many administrative schemes, there is much to be said for this latter view.
25 See, for example, Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson [1989] 1 SCR 1038.
26 The leading authority for this proposition is Canada(Attorney General)vMossop [1993] 1 SCR 554.
27 304 US 144 (1938).
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rule of law, and contrary to the constitutional right of everyone to lawful
administrative action and to access to the courts. However, as I have tried to
show, the kind of pragmatic or functional approach developed by courts in
Canada towards the allocation of responsibilities between themselves and
specialist administrative bodies created by legislatures for the delivery of
public programmes both adequately protects against the dangers of bureaucratic over- (or under-) reaching, and avoids unduly burdening an already
hard-pressed public administration.
The right to challenge the legality of administrative action in judicial
review proceedings does not determine the standard by which the reviewing
court must determine whether the impugned action was unlawful. If the
question in dispute is more appropriately decided by the agency because, for
example, it falls at least as much within the agency's expertise as the court's, I
see no constitutional basis for judicial intervention, provided, of course, that
reasons have been given for the administrative action in question, no other
constitutional rights are at risk, and the action has a rational basis.
Only an extreme positivist view of the rule of law, such as that posited in
the late nineteenth century by AV Dicey in his Introduction to the Study of the
Law of the Constitution,assigns to the 'ordinary courts' the power to substitute
their view for that of other actors in the administrative state on the correct
interpretation of enabling legislation and its application to given facts. Such a
view is incompatible both with the often open-textured nature of law and the
blurred boundary between the interpretation of a statutory provision and the
exercise of discretion, 28 and with the constitutional responsibility of
Parliament for designing, and of the administration for efficiently and
effectively delivering, the public programmes needed to bring about the social
and economic transformations to which South Africa is now committed. I
would agree with the following comment by Professor Hoexter:
'Now, of course, we have entered an era of constitutional democracy, an era in which it is no
longer possible automatically to equate deference with acquiescence in political repression;
an era, 29indeed, in which executive-mindedness might sometimes be a desirable judicial
stance.'

I
2'

See the observation to this effect in Baker supra note 16.

Op cit note 5 at 488.

